The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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See1et N0F0RN
reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does
reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­
logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national
policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable
reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.
Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of
this volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript,
Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon­
strated her high talent as a copy editor, and[
[ provided
staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to
more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and
Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic
Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the
call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly
work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this
handsome volume.
Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W.
Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this
work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began
research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff
on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and
Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter­
viewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning
to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member
of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns
Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence
officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow
undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized.
edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be­
come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly
benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history
of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦
J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff
April 1992