The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to
begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President
granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take
place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a
CIA and State Department recommendation that West German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to
overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex­
isting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of
Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had
invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show,
which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff
Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a
week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet
Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left.11
Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union
were cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell
and the Chief of Station for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed
Chancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans
_Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project. 11
A few days later the Air Force delegation returned from
Moscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of opera­
tions against the Soviet Union.
While waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear,
Detachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on
2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Romania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President
Eisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the
President found "very interesting, very positive." Eisenhower was
anxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft.
Bissell replied that, although East European radars had picked up the
20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000
feet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morn­
ing's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2
" Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1966), pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
"' OSA History, chap. 11. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
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Chapter 3
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