The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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115
The Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2
airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector
of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more
important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the
manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in
Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because of the
Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like
a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after
landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence
Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex­
ploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the
U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on
tactical developments around Suez.
PIO acted quickly co carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and
Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe head­
quarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for
processing and inte retin U-2 film in West Gennany. They had
C
been preceded by:.,;--,r;,.,.-.,...,..-,.-,.,..,....,-..,.1 hief of PIO's Special· Projects
Branch. Following eta1 e
sions with Air Force photo­
. intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a por­
tion of a nea,by Air F-; photo laboratory for developing U-2 film.
With the assistance ofl
lchi7~TAUTOMAT
photo laboratory, and
1r t-orce personnel,L__J had the lab
ready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission
f m the Middle East. After quickly developing the film,
d his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud­
1 d 1t or indications of British and French preparations for hostilities
and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September.
Although the Air Force provided considerable assistance in es­
tablishing!
[ photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not
like the idea of CIA personnel controlling overseas photo processing
and interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force con­
trol. Further negotiations led to a CIA-Air Force agreement at the end
of October. under which the Air Force would name the commanding
officer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy,
who was responsible for technical and intelligence matters:'
PIO soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the
West German operation, which continued to develop and interpret
U-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and
'' Ibid .. pp. 49-52 (S).
~etNOFORN
Chapter 3
Geeret