The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 3
angered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He
quickly called for a cease-fire ~and denied the United Kingdom any
further U-2 photographs of the Middle Eaaj
The l November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photo­
graphed Anglo-French preparations to invade Egypt. President
Eisenhower was informed of this impending invasion on Sunday, 4
November. On the following day, British and French paratroopers
dropped near Port Said at the north end of the Suez Canal. This action
prompted Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin to send messages to
France, Britain, and Israel warning that the Soviet Union was ready to
use force to crush the aggressors. 55
Early on the morning of election day, 6 November, the
Anglo-French invasion armada arrived at Port Said and began landing
troops. Back in Washington President Eisenhower met with Allen
Dulles to discuss the deepening international crisis. Worried that the
Soviet Union might be poised to intervene in the war, the President
ordered Dulles to have the Adana-based U-2s fly over Syria to see
whether the Soviets were moving planes to Syrian airbases in
preparation for a strike against the forces attacking Egypt. The answer
to Eisenhower's question came much sooner than expected because
on the previous day a U-2 had already overflown Syria before making
a run across northern Egypt. The film from this flight had reached
Wiesbaden for processing and readout during the night. The results
were in the hands of the PARAMOUNT Committee by midmorning
on 6 November, while the President was motoring to Gettysburg to
cast his ballot. By the time the President returned to the White House
by helicopter at noon, Colonel Goodpaster was waiting for him with
an answer: there were no Soviet aircraft in Syria. Because of the
President's concern about possible Soviet moves, Syria was the target
of 14 additional U-2 flights between 7 November and 18 December
1956.56
The increasing reliance on Adana-based U-2s for coverage of the
Middle East during the Suez Crisis made it difficult for the
photointerpreters to supply timely information. When Detachment B
aircraft returned to their base at Adana, there were no film-processing
" Donald Neff, Warriors at Sue:-.: Eisenhower Takes America intv the Middle East (New
York: Simon and Schuster. 1981 ), p. 403.
'" Memorandum of Conference. 6 November 1956. Eisenhower Diary, Whitman File,
DDEL (U); OSA History, chap. 19, annex 120, p. 3 (TS Codeword).
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