The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially
agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really impor­
tant results" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He,
nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI
Cabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer
than the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish
a reference bank of geographic and manmade features. Siding with
Cabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the need for more intelligence to
make estimates better.
President Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments.
Although willing to consider extensions of the radar-seeking ferret
flights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained op­
posed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union.
Events in Eastern Europe in the fall of l 956 helped to change the
President's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away from a
confrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to
find itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demon­
strations led to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy
• on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew
from Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November,
however, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were
getting out of hand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his
nation's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact-and ordered Soviet
troops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President
Eisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA re­
quests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian
rebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights of that nation, in­
cluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made.
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Although President Eisenhower had not been willing to allow
overflights during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union's actions in
Hungary convinced him to authorize renewed overflights of the
Soviet Bloc, a decision that was made easier by his reelection by a
large margin in early November. Initially. however, the President only
authorized overflights of Eastern Europe and Soviet border regions,
not the deep penetration overflights that had been requested by CIA.
At a 15 November 1956 meeting with Acting Secretary of State
Herbert Hoover, Jr. (John Foster Dulles was recovering from cancer
~• Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
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Chapter 3