The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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6cc. ct P.OFORN
Chapter 1
By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had
been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Soviet
military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi­
ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities­
bomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap­
ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air
defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory
policies, was also largely an unknown factor.
Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed
the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet
Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone,
telegraph, and radio-telephone-more secure, thereby greatly reduc­
ing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu­
rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively
blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents
using covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and
from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re­
port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth­
ods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence
tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other
methods were available.
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance
Although at the end of World War II the United States had captured
large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet
Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source
of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was
interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To
obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence
community established several programs to debrief German scientists
who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but
were now being allowed to leave.~
: At the end of World War II. th<! British had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor.
mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and
the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical
information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather
intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab­
sorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<!­
gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit
individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had
worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the
Returnee Exploitation Group (REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of
s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[
)
he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service
Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff .. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).
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