The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sewet NOFOHN
Chapter 3
DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY
·operation SOFf TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high
water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment
B staged one more overflight on IO September 1957. when a U-2 pi­
loted by William Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin
Yar Missile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in
1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted
its successful overflight of the lCBM impact site at Klyuchi, and
October saw the final two overflights of Detachment A. After these
missions, penetration overflights became a rarity. There would be
only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two. in 1959;
and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this
period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of flights along
Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated shon distances inside
the border. but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of
authorizing ''deep penetration·• overflights. which invariably brought
protests from Moscow.
The border flights took place under tight controls. Beginning in
the fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coor­
dinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement:
" This is not a penetration overflight'' and warned about flying too
close to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down
U-2 at Bodo, Norway
Secret