The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the
west-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed
at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned
abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to
110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One of the key arguments
that convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles 's
claim that the balloons' "chance of being detected is rather small and
their identification or shootdown practically nil." 96
Release of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the
Bering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28
July, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made,
camera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland.
The loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon
was equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its
camera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force
technician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons
should cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he ad­
justed regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after
. 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three suc­
cessive days. however, the technician forgot to reset the timing de­
vices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three
WS-461 L balloon payloads was recovered.'n
The Polish protest was quickly followed by a Soviet note pro­
testing the balloons' violation of the Soviet Union's airspace. Several
months later, the Soviets placed the US balloon and photographic
equipment on display in Moscow for the world's press. President
Eisenhower was angry that the Defense Department's assurances that
the balloons would not be detected had proved false. Even worse, one
of the balloons had been recovered by the Poles because the Air Force
had disobeyed his instructions for the balloon project. When the Air
Force had proposed the use of timers to bring down the balloons at
the end of the mission, Eisenhower had said no, fearing that a mal­
function could cause the balloons to come down prematurely. Furious
at the Air Force's insubordination, the President ordered General
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 25 June 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
'" Donald E. Welzenbach. "Observation Balloons and Weather Satellites," Studies in
Intelligence 30 (Spring 1986): pp. 26-28 (S).
Secret r'10FORN
Chapter 3
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