The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Seeret NOFOAN
Chapter 3
President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower
tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US
balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms Iimita­
tion negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United
States sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to
US proposals for a " study of the technical aspects of safeguards
against the possibility of surprise attack ... One week later the S,oviets
agreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on
IO November I 958. President Eisenhower was also attempting tt:> per­
suade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmo­
spheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22
August 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the
condition that the Soviet Union al so refrain from further tests and join
in negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ac­
cepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 3 I October 1958 in
Geneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree
to a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on I and 3
November. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of
1958, President Eisenhower. detennined to reduce to a minimum any
aggravation of the Soviets. kept the U-2 overflight program in
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In November 1958, relations with the Soviet Union worsened af­
ter Khrushchev precipitated a new crisis over West Berlin by an­
nouncing plans to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by May
1959. He stated that such a treaty would terminate Allied rights in
West Berlin. Four days later, Soviet troops began harassing US Anny
truck convoys on the highways leading from West Germany to West
Berlin. Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening
as the blockade of l 948-49, President Eisenhower wished to :avoid
any actions that would provoke the Soviets. Tension over West Berlin
was, therefore, an additional reason for continuing to keep the U-2
away from the Soviet Bloc. oo:
CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2
Another reason for President Eisenhower's gro~ ing rel!J.~ ance to au­
thorize flights over the Soviet Union may have ~ en c~ ;rn , hat the
Soviets were developing countenneasures that would enable them to
"" Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 489-J9 I.
"'' Ibid .. pp. 502-504.
Secret