The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

165
Sec. et NOFORl'J
Chapter 4
-
J .
•. ~ ·~-:.. -?.,-
.._.,.,,..__,_~ -
-.
-~1}').'~F '<
....;
Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning.
14
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determinced to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis­
sile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli­
gence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. Alt this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was e:<tremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only bie de­
ployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed rai!lroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles. tlhere­
fore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the
" Licklider. "Missile Gap Controversy." pp. 608-609.
. •
-r.- -·
~
·
Saratov Engels Airfield,
6 December 1959