The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

i
167
President"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle
urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to
the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as
summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed
that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in
his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one
tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free
world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were
lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could
be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness."
15
A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over
the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis­
sion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary
1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at
the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE
EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed
northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long
stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from
tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis­
cover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.
16
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con­
tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis­
sions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence
of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re­
sumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be
flown during the month of March. The President's continued riestric­
tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo­
randum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein."
'' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233.
" Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword).
" OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. "The President's Board:
1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S).
Chapter 4
5eeret