The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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174
Sec, el NOFOAN
Chapter 4
of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME
STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather
( which would affect both navigation and photography) because the
flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire
mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of
its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960,
Colonel Burke stated:
Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can as­
sume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will
be detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in
denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a
strong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would
permit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile
equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus
enhancing the possibility ofsuccessful intercept. In addition, we
must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically in­
terfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail­
able to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they
desire to do so. 15
The concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should
also have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would
be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed
covering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the
U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to
intercept the aircraft.
The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis
Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers
had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis­
sions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China
as well as six along the Soviet border.
To prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project manag­
ers decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night be­
fore the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera
was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure
to local residents because of darkness and its short stay-less than six
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William
Burke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
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