The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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183
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 4
THE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interro­
gation at the hands of the Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on
what to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told
that he might as well tell the Soviets whatever they wanted to know
because they could get the information from his aircraft anyway.
Nevertheless, Powers tried to conceal as much classified information
as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap­
tors. To extract the maximum propaganda value from the U-2 Affair,
the Soviets prepared an elaborate show trial for Powers, which began
on 17 August 1960. Powers continued to conceal as much information
as possible, but, on the advice of his Soviet defense counsel, he stated
that he was sorry for his actions. The Soviet court sentenced him to
IO years' "deprivation of liberty," with the first three to be spent in
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pnson.
During the next 18 months, confidential negotiations to obtain
the release of Powers took place as the United States explored the
possibility of trading convicted Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel for
_Powers. These negotiations were conducted by Abel ·s court-ap­
pointed defense counsel, former OSS lawyer James Donovan. in cor­
respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East
Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI Pearre Cabell wrote to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk supporting such a trade, and on l 0
February 1962 the actual exchange took place in the middle of the
Glienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin. As part of the
deal, American graduate student Frederick Pryor, who had been jailed
in East Germany for espionage, was released at another location.
After Powers returned to the United States, he underwent exten­
sive debriefing, for many questions about his mission remained unan­
swered. To conduct the debriefing, the Agency immediately
reconvened the Damage Assessment Team that had met for two
months in the summer of 1960 to estimate what Powers knew about
the overflight program and could have told Soviet interrogators.
Given Powers' long involvement with the U-2 program, the team had
concluded in 1960 that his knowledge was extensive and he had prob­
ably revealed most of it to the Soviets. After two weeks of debriefing
Powers in February 1962, however, the team found that the damage
was much less than had been estimated, and they were quite satisfied
" Powers. Operation Overjlight, pp. 160-192; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 33 1-335.
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