The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 5
supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most ad­
vanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The C[A opposed a
Nationalist Chinese U-2 program because such flights would des.troy
the existing unclassified cover for the U-2. In discussions with the, Air
Force, DDCI Cabell only consented to having Nationalist p.ilots
trained to fly U-2s so that they would be ready in case they were
needed in the future; he opposed any Nationalist overflights. The
training of the Nationalist Chinese pilots began in March 1959 .. By
the end of the year, there was a group of trained pilots ready for oper­
ations, and DCI Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to dis,cuss
the program's future. Dulles reaffirmed the Agency's opposition to
Nationalist Chinese U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A
reconnaissance aircraft