The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Before the month was over, however, another confrontation be­
tween Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted.
The Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC
troops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationalist-held
Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
immediately ordered U-2 coverage of the Strait area to determine the
extent of the PRC buildup. In response, Detachment H flew six mis­
sions over the Strait between 25 June and 28 July 1962. To speed up
the readout of this photography, the films were processed at the Asian
Photographic Interpretation Center (ASPIC) at Yokota, Japan, a joint
military-CIA endeavor. The U-2 coverage ended in late July when it
became apparent that the PRC did not intend to mount an invasion of
the offshore islands:~
The pace of Detachment H m1ss10ns slowed considerably in
August 1962; the sole Project TACKLE overflight covered Peiping
and Manchuria. The following month the detachment mounted two
missions. one over south China on the eighth and the second over
Kiangsu Province on the ninth. Unfortunately, mechanical difficulties
led to the loss of the latter aircraft near Lu-shan. A flameout forced
- the U-2 down to an altitude where PRC interceptors were able to hit
the U-2 with an air-to-air rocket. The Nationalist Chinese pilot para­
chuted and was captured. At this point, President Kennedy ordered a
standdown of overflights of the PRC."'
Following the capture of the Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot, the
People ·s Republic of China accused the
United States of
masterminding the overflights, but the State Department denied any
involvement. Nationalist China then revealed that the United States
had granted it a license to purchase two U-2 aircraft. In a l 3
September 1962 response to the Chinese protest, President Kennedy
denied any responsibility for the sale of the U-2s to Taiwan. noting
that the sale had occurred under the previous administration. He
stated that there were no current plans to sell any more U-2s to
Nationalist China. Eight months later, however, the President ap­
proved an export license for the delivery of another U-2 to Taiwan.
Such licenses were needed only for cover purposes. The Agency con­
tinued to maintain two U-2s on Taiwan, bringing new ones in to
replace aircraft lost in training or on missions.
'' OSA History, chap. 17, p. 46 (TS Codeword).
'·' Ibid.. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 125 ( 11 August 1962). GRC 126
(8 September 1962), and GRC 127 (9 September 1962), OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes
20 and 21 (TS Codeword).
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
Sec1et