The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sect et NOFOFll'\I
Chapter 5
within 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and
all of North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or the coast.
The remaining portions of Indochina remained the responsibility of
the Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of
Indochina:5
U-2s in India
In October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of
massive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western
provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier
Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north
of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.
The Indian Government appealed to the United States for mili­
tary aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that
Indian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could
not be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith,
therefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial recon­
_naissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with
a more accurate picture of the Communist Chinese incursions. On 11
November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the
proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel
the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace:6
In late November, Detachment G deployed to Ta Khli, Thailand,
to carry out the overflights of the Sino-Indian border area. Since the
U-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the tar­
get area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, re­
quired midair refueling.
Because of severe winter weather conditions, the first flight did
not take place until 5 December. Poor weather and air turbulence
hampered the mission, and only 40 percent of the target area could be
photographed. A second mission on 10 December was more success­
ful, but the U-2 experienced rough engine performance because of
icing of the fuel lines.47
" OSA History, chap. I6, pp. 18- I 9 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., chap. 16, pp. 26-27 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., p. 28 (TS Codeword); Mission folders 320 I (5 December 1962 and 3203 ( I 0
December 1962), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 26 (TS Codeword).
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