The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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235
The danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the
PRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second
Project TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on
its way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile
test range. As was the case after the first operational loss over China
in September 1961, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of over­
flights of mainland China. This standdown lasted almost five months.
As a result of this second loss over the PRC, the Office of
Special Activities began installing a new 30-channel telemetry system
aboard Detachment H U-2s to monitor various aircraft functions.
Known as BIRDWATCHER, this unit periodically broadcast a burst
of data to the airbase that launched the U-2. This data burst contained
a status report on all the major systems aboard the plane, such as air­
speed, altitude, exhaust temperature, fuel supply, film supply, and ox­
ygen supply. BIRDWATCHER provided project managers with a
benchmark of aircraft performance that could be used to determine if
a lost plane had been shot down at altitude or had suffered mechanical
failure. 54
BIRDWATCHER's first operational use came on 16 March
1964, when overflights resumed with a mission over southern China.
The PRC was now a high-priority target for the U-2 because more
data were needed to prepare National Intelligence Estimates due in
the autumn. Of particular concern was the PRC's nuclear program.
Despite the high priority of its missions, Detachment H's resources
remained scarce. It was short of both pilots and planes and never had
more than three U-2s or six qualified Nationalist Chinese pilots at any
one time. By the spring of 1964, crashes during training and the two
losses over the mainland had reduced Detachment H to only two qual­
ified pilots, one of whom suffered from ulcers and a nervous disorder.
Indeed, this pilot had every reason to be nervous; he flew three of the
next four Detachment H overflights and became the third Nationalist
Chinese pilot to be shot down over the mainland.
This loss came on 7 July 1964. The Nationalist Chinese pilot's
last transmission was that his System-XII unit had alerted him that he
was being tracked by the FAN SONG radar. BIRDWATCHER data
revealed that the aircraft was at penetration altitude and all systems
'" Ibid., p. 51. 53 (TS Codeword).
6eeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
Sea,et