The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 6
260
altitudes of 80,000 to 90,000 feet but only at subsonic speeds, just
enough to keep it airborne. 1
The slow-flying Northrop design did not solve the problem of
radar detection, and in 1957 the emphasis switched to supersonic de­
signs. In August 1957, the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI), a
CIA proprietary firm that had been working on ways to reduce the
U-2's vulnerability to radar, began to investigate the possibility of
designing an aircraft with a very small radar cross section. SEI soon
discovered that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of de­
tection by radar.1 From this point on, the CIA's attention focused in­
creasingly on the possibility of building an aircraft that could fly at
both extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating
the best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques.
THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNS FOR
A SUCCESSOR TO THE U-2
By the autumn of 1957, Bissell and Gibbs had collected so many
ideas for a successor to the U-2 that Bissell asked DCI Dulles for per­
mission to establish an advisory committee to assist in the selection
process. Bissell also felt that the support of a committee of prominent
scientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask
for funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the
chairman of the new committee, which included some of the scien­
tists and engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for
overhead reconnaissance: Edward Purcell, Allen F. Donovan, H.
Guyford Stever, and Eugene P. Kiefer. The Air Force's chief scientist,
Courtland D. Perkins, was also a member. The committee first met in
November 1957 and held six more meetings between July 1958 and
the late summer of 1959. The meetings usually took place in Land's
Boston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant
Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, and
his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air­
craft manufacturers also attended some of the meetings.3
' Donovan interview (S).
Minnich, "The OXCART Story,"' Studies in Intelligence 15 (Winter 1971 ):2 (S).
'Clarence L. Johnson, Report No. SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program,"
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. I July 1968, p. I (TS Codeword).
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