The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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267
Secret NOF'OFU~
Chapter 6
Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this
type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had
been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat­
ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that
CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were
working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested
that the Air Force "could support the project by transferring some re­
connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked
the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss
further stages of the project with him. 7
COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,
Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro­
posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis­
tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.
lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome­
non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon­
naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to
as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the
strength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated
by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar
screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to
45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this
area reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its
size-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.
This return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a
spot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also
depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger
objects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and
kept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of
view.
'Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December
1958. 10:26 a.m.," 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
See.et