The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de­
cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No.
11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a
total cost of $16 l.2 million. 21
The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force
order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the
A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier
interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the
assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force
entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air­
craft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew­
man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project
KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de­
signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the
United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to
I 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes
were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because
Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut­
ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro­
jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2~
Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble
containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle.
In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire
OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the
office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy
to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and
Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air­
craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel
Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the
transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep­
ing the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story ...
p. 10 (S).
"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this
period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158.
particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine
would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September
1961.
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
Seeaet