John Company

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

CIA-UAP-003 · page 310 of 406

Page 310 of 406 of CIA-UAP-003

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297
~eeret NOFOPU''l
Chapter 6
decided to go to Nevada and take charge of the OXCART's develop­
ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in
his notes in the project log:
I uncovered many items ofa managerial, materiel and design na­
ture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera­
tion.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,
going over in detail all problems on the aircraft .... Increased the
supervision in the electrical group by 500% .... We tightened up
the inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.
It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer­
ing.... The addition of so many systems to the A-12 has greatly
complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problem."''
These improvements in on-site management got the project back on
schedule.
By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART
deployment were finished. During these tests. the OXCART achieved
a maximum speed of Mach 3.29. an altitude of 90,000 feet. and sus­
tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum
- errdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22 November.
Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the
Office of Special Activities, stating. "'The time has come when the
bird should leave its nest. .. ""
Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962.
the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find
work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.
DISCUSSIONS ON THE OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
Although the OXCART had been designed to replace the U-2 as a
strategic reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the Soviet Union, this use
had become doubtful long before the OXCART was ready for
operational use. The U-2 Affair of 1960 made Presidents very reluc­
tant to consider overflights of the Soviet Union. Indeed. Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy had both stated publicly that the United
States would not conduct such overflights. In July 1962. Secretary of
"Johnson, .. Archangel log," 5 August-30 April 1965.
''' Minnich, "'OXCART Story... p. 23 (S).
Secret