The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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306
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK
SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de­
tected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD
missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude
that no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North
Vietnam. 61
Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all
operational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica­
tions between Headauarters and KadenaJ
I
A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south
of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas­
ses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand
area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it
spent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a "single-pass" mis­
sion, and 21.5 minutes during a "two-pass" mission. Because of its
wide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into
Chinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.
After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent
by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late
summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do­
ing the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands
of US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of a mission's com­
pletion.
BLACK SHIELD activity continued unabated during the second
half of 1967. From 16 August to 31 December 1967, 26 missions
were alerted and 15 were flown. On I 7 September one SAM site
tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful
with its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not until 28 October that a
North Vietnamese SAM site launched a missile at the OXCART.
Mission photography documented the event with photographs of mis­
sile smoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and
its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the
OXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger the air­
craft.
•• Minnich. '"OXCART Story:· pp. 25-28 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 119-124, ann.:x
152 (TS Cod.:word).
ieeret