The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

59
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 2
SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT
On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air
Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2)
in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary respon­
sibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project
(AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for
the security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a
heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to
keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine
which contractor employees require security clearances and has had
to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing fa­
cilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has
been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25
The most important aspect of the security program for the U-2
project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for
the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the
U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of
_CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.
The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also
played a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnais­
sance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the
Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with
each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots
were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known
as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise air­
craft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article num­
bers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as
KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot).
Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell
into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords
or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication of the
nature of the program. -'6
Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement
of CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altime­
ters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the
" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).
,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).
Secret