John Company

Analysis of Flying Object Incidents in the United States, 1948

DOW-UAP-D093 · page 12 of 67

Page 12 of 67 of DOW-UAP-D093

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'asouoes a definable pattern." There is a large concentration of aight­
inga along the ~stern Seaboard. another large concentration throU(;h­
out the 1t'ostern Coast states, and a . few sightiru?s
-
'-n the Mi ddle ,1est.
Distribution of incidonts by configuration of object snd description
of maneuverability is approximately equal in each of theoo araaa and
this i o believed to further 'substanti ate the possibility tbet one type
of object mieht have been observed in different asneots of fli€ht.
If sightings are induced by rumor, it seeca unusU£>1 t.lult more
incidenta have not been reported from tho vreas with hi€h concentra­
t 1on of population.
Reports from such areas would also hnve creater
facility in channel1IJG either to newspapers or official reporting ngon­
clee. For the most part, _o1ght1J1€;s have b~en made 1n fairly onen country
where there are few ro,trictione to vhibilit7, .·~-hich may indicate that .
obstructod vision hn.o reduced oightingo in bu11,-up aroas.
It thorofore Geems th.at aome type of flying objoct has been ob­
served; tho identification of ita origin requires tho co~!pletion of other
3. Eoaa1blo Or1«1~ of UnuoU4l J'lrlns Objnpt1& Provided, upon the
completion of annlyaeB, it 1c inrlicated that nome or nll of the reported
flyill8 objects over the U.S. nro of foreign or1&in, the objectc could
from a logical viewpoint, be couaidered Soviet. It is evident from the
perforaance character1et1oe attributed to the un1dnntified objectn at
thiu time that 1f they are foreign, the1 involve efficiencies of por­
formanoe which hnve not been ro&liz•d in nn~ op~rat1ollt\l airborne de­
vice in thie country. It would, therefo•e, be o. rnietake to analyae the
technical n,weets of the situation within th• limtt, of our cwn knowl­
edge of p~actinnl dcvelopmentn.
It is more deeirable to consider then
the 0\1ter llmiti, of poealble Soviet develop11entfl and objecti1.ve11 in nt•
tEJmptlng to !c,rmul&.te aom
idea of the tectic" whioh might be involved.