Analysis of Flying Object Incidents in the United States, 1949

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the Russian oll situation (regardless of estimated 011 reserves) is quite dl:fferent from that 1n the
U.S. For example, U.S. oil industry 1s prepared to turn out tremendous quantities of highly frac­
tionated petroleum products, while the U .S.S.R. cannot reasonably approach such capabilities. This
consideration dictates different solutions on fuels for propulsion 1n the two countries and in turn,
dictates the direction taken in development of jet motors or the use of other propulsive devices.
We must therefore, arrive at the. conclusion that any Soviet device which may have made its
appearance over the U.S. as descrlb~d, would possess unusual performance characterist1cs which,
in all probability, would include unusual range. The poss1b111ty that they could have been launched
at fairly close range should not be discarded.
4. POSSIBLE REASONS OR TACTICS FOR THE USE OF SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT
ego
o
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flown over the U.S. for one, all, or a combination of the following reasons:
a. TO NEGATE U.S. CONFIDENCE IN ATOM BOMB AS THE MOST ADVANC
DECISIVE
a
sense,
tliaf1lie'Soviets would choose first to frighten pro-American nations in Europe with the appearance
of a radically new weapon to counteract the ability of the U.S. to obtain full propaganda effective­
ness with the atom bomb. It will be remembered that strange objects first appeared over the
Scandinavian countries 1n 1946. The objects observed there had unusual range and unusual per­
formance characteristics. As this demonstration over the Scandinavian countries occurred the
U.S. was making a vigorous campaign for the economic and political allgnment of these nations
with other pro-American Western European nations. When these incidents. subsided, strange flying
objects began to be observed at an increasing rate over the U.S. The conclusion on thls point is
that flying objects may have been used to frighten both European nations and the U.S. by the appear­
ance of a new device, and that failure to identify such a Soviet object would give them invaluable
indication that U.s. development is far behind that of the Soviets.
Except for this indication, it is
beUeved that the use of the objects to promote fear has been worthless 1n that the U.S. public has
tended to characterize these incidents entirely as halluclnations by "crack pots", m1sident1ficat1on
of conventional objects, or that they represent a secret American project which should not be pub­
licized. Any fear· that might result from Soviet use will come only by a discovery that the objects
have been Soviet aircraft and that they involve radical developments which are in advance of. our
own accomplishments.
b. FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE. It ls possible that the Soviets have employed the
flying o ec
or
e co ec on
p o ograp c intelligence or the mapping of certain areas in the
U.S. The evasive action employed by all objects sighted indicates not so much an attempt to avoid
pelng sighted, as an attempt to prevent disclosure of the exact type of flying craft and its mission.
The sighting of objects over the U.S. has been most intense in Eastern and Western Coastal States.
In addition, sightings of flying objects have been made near Oak Ridge, Tenn., Las Cruces, N. M.,
and in the general area o! the Hanford Works in Oregon. Generally, sightings have not been made
over what we consider strategic industrial areas. The reason for this. might be either that the.
flying objects have been observed only enroute to or from missions over these more concentrated
strategic areas, or that the Soviets obtained sufficient information during their World War Il liaison
with U.S. industry to satisfy their intelligence requirements and have a more active requirement
for information on industries and areas which were not available to them during World War TI con­
tacts. This 1s of interest in connection with the sightings near Oak Ridge, Las Cruces, and in the
general area of the Hanford· Works since these establishments were not, and are not, accessible to
Soviet collectors of photographic intelligence .
. c. TEST OF U. S. DEFENSES. It 1s possible that the use of Soviet flying objects over the U.S.
is inten
o y o e erm e
e ability of the U.S. defenses to spot foreign aircraft. This would
be of extreme importance to the U .S.S.R. 1n the event that a one-way all-out attack of Soviet strate­
...
gic bombers ls planned. Ability to operate over the U.S. unlnhlblted at a time when the U. S. is
supposedly re-arming and putting great stress on defenses would provide valuable lnf ormation on
which to base estimates for probability of success in bombing strategic objectives in the U. S.
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