The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Seeret NOFORP•
Chapter 2
88
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protesLS. CIA officials be­
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights. including those
by the U-2. which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the ..additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights. thus increasing the di ffi.culties of policy decisions which
would permit such operations in the: future."
73
In addition to its concern for tlhe future of the U-2 program. the
Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over­
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee-a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR :SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded se­
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell , the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom­
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem­
bers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a
result of the senators' recornmendllttion that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congress.ional knowledge of the U-2 pro­
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcomrninee
did not recei\·e a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss
of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.
7
"
" Philip G. Strong. Attachment 10 Mcmoran<l um for DCI Dulks...Projcct GENETRIX
Summary." 15 Fcbruary 1956. OSI records (S)1.
" John S. Warn.:r. Lcgislativc Counsel. McrnoranJum for the Rccord ...AQUATONE
Bri.:tings:· 18 Novc:mbc:r 1957. Office of C,ongressional Affairs rci:onJs. job 61-357.
box 2 (S): Wam.:r interview (S).
Secr:et