The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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89
~eeret NOFOAN
Chapter 2
THE U-2 COVER STORY
In February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still
raging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests,
Richard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for over­
seas operations. It was important to have a plausible reason for de­
ploying such an unusual looking plane, whose glider wings and odd
landing gear were certain to arouse curiosity.
Bissell decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2
was an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). Such a cover
story, however, needed the approval of all concerned: Air Force intel­
ligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air
Division, the SAC U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters
project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Moreover,
the CIA Scientific Advisory Committee was also consulted about the
cover plan.
Senior CIA officials and the other agencies involved in provid­
• ing cover for the U-2 approved the final version of the overall cover
story at the end of March 1956. The project staff then began working
on contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory.
Bissell advised the project's cover officer to "produce a document
which sets forth all actions to be taken ... not only press releases and
the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and
at least an indication of the diplomatic action....We should at least
make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really
orderly fashion." The cover officer then prepared emergency proce­
dures based on the overall weather research cover story, and Bissell
approved these plans. There was one final high-level look at the cover
story on 21 June 1956, the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern
Europe, when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian,
and Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet
Union, including the proposed emergency procedures. Killian and
Land disagreed with Bissell's concept and made a much bolder and
more forthright proposal: in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile
territory, the United States should not try to deny responsibility but
should state that overflights were being conducted "to guard against
surprise attack." This proposal was put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re­
mained the basis for statements to be made after a loss. The project
staff then went on to prepare a number of different statements to be
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