The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
same time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told
Prime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath,
when in reality there were four.'
THE MOVE TO WIESBADEN
To avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to
begin the program of U-2 overflights beyond the Iron Curtain without
further delay, Bissell moved Detachment A on 11 June I 956 to
Wiesbaden, one of the busiest airfields in West Germany, without
notifying West German authorities. The detachment commander, Col.
Frederick McCoy, was disappointed in his hope that the redeployment
of the U-2s could be accomplished without drawing undue attention.
The strange-looking planes, with bicycle-type wheels and wings so
long they touched the ground after landing, aroused considerable in­
terest. Wiesbaden was to be only a temporary home for Detachment
A; the Air Force began preparing Giebelstadt near the East German
border for use by the U-2s. Giebelstadt was an old World War II
airbase that had been one of the launching sites for the GENETRIX
balloons.5
Soon after the four U-2s arrived in Wiesbaden, they were refitted
with the more powerful J57/P-3 l engines. The new engines were bet­
ter suited for operations behind the Iron Curtain because they were
less likely to suffer flameouts than the earlier model. Once the new
engines were installed, the aircraft received the designation U-2B.6
Bissell was anxious to get the overflights started by late June
because SAC weather experts had predicted that the best weather for
photographing the Soviet Union would be between 20 June and 10
July. Bissell, however, had not yet received final authorization from
President Eisenhower to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. On 28
May 1956, when DCI Allen Dulles met with the President to discuss
the U-2's readiness for operations, Eisenhower still made no decision
on overflights. Three days later Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff
' Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British
Intelligence Community (New York. 1986). pp. 495-496; Beschloss, Mayday, p. I16; OSA
History, chap. 11, pp. 18-21 (TS Codeword).
' OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 21-23 (TS Codeword).
• Ibid .. pp. 23, 26 (TS Codeword).
Secret