The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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96
See1 et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining
"AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President
Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi­
nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During
his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision
on the overflight program. 7
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS
The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet
Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence
about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con­
cerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.
From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower
had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to
hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft
were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the
Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of
the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the
same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to
take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.
In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis­
sions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his
famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2
was still under development but making good progress. At the
Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower
offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for
the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in­
stallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with
similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.
Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept
his proposal. he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was
still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, 'Tl\ give it one shot.
Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2."x
' Ibid., pp. 23-25 and anne:( 73. "AQUATONE Operational Plans,.. 31 May 1956 (TS
Codeword).
·' Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.
Secaet