The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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109
Sect et NOFORl'1
Chapter 3
SOVIET PROTEST NOTE
The 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet
Union on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in
Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a
"twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force" and
gave details of the routes flown by the first two missions. The note
did not mention Moscow or Leningrad, however, because the Soviets
had not been able to track these portions of the overflights. The
Soviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as "inten­
tional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence . ., As soon as the
note arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956,
Colonel Goodpaster called Bissell and told him to stop all U-2 over­
flights until further notice. The next morning Goodpaster met with
Bissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three additional flights
had taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet note but
added that no more were planned. 35
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Later Eisenhower told Goodpaster that he "didn't like a thing"
about the Soviet note and was going to discuss the matter with
Secretary of State Dulles. With the strong approval of President
Eisenhower, Goodpaster informed DCI Dulles that "there is to be no
mention of the existence of this project or of operations incident to it,
outside the Executive Branch, and no mention within the Executive
Branch to others than those who directly need to know of the opera­
tion, as distinguished from output deriving from it." 36
During these initial overflights, the U-2 flew above 69,000 feet
and could be seen only fleetingly by pilots of the Soviet interceptor
aircraft. Thus, it appears that the Soviet claim that the intruder was a
twin-engine bomber was probably based on the assumption that this
was another overflight by a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine
Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in
1953. The US reply, sent to the Soviets on 19 July, truthfully denied
that any US "military planes" had overflown the Soviet Union on the
days in question. Meanwhile, on 16 July the Polish Ambassador to
" "Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I 0, I 956 with U.S. Reply, ..
US Department of State Bulletin, 30 July I 956, pp. 19 I- I 92: Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
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