The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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110
Sec,el NOFORN
Chapter 3
the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of
Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note
from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was
sent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37
The details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro­
tests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet in­
terception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected
over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked
for extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President
Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the
President recalled how he had been told that "not over a very minor
percentage of these (flights) would be picked up." He went on to
question "how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection
is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing
U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had
"lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United
States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the
reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the
American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that
their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet pro­
tests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would
•
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,, 38
be quite ano er.
The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not
lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he
met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to
help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to
reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus­
ceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug­
gested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore
them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a
project known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called
the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air
Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the
Agency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by sev­
eral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into
·" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I 0, 1956 with U.S. Reply,"
US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp.
32-33 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
Searet