John Company

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

CIA-UAP-003 · page 125 of 406

Page 125 of 406 of CIA-UAP-003

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Seeret NOFOAN
Chapter 3
112
No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates."
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba­
sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates:1
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de­
cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi­
nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX pro­
gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in­
volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
" John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
~eeret