The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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39
Sec, et NOFOAP4
Chapter 3
radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The ef­
fort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the
year.
THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP
During the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had
made eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over
the Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of
August with their initial evaluation of the photography obtained by
these flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move
on 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the
photo interpreters were finished, they were able to write "finis" to the
controversy over Soviet bomber strength.
Although the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union pos­
sessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers,
U-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison
6ombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by
the July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by
the photographs of the Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he
called "million-dollar" photography. The actual value of the U-2
photos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their ev­
idence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for ad­
ditional B-52 bombers to "catch up" to the Soviets."0
Because of the need to protect the source of the information
about Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue
did not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA
began providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photog­
raphy without identifying the source, some members of Congress­
unaware of the existence of the U-2-questioned the motivation be­
hind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier es­
timates of Soviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air
Force appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by
White House direction in order to hold down military expenditures.
•• Records of Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS
Codeword).
~• NP!C History, vol. I. p. 23 (S).
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