The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 3
become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the
United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To
handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which
later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation be­
tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to
include frequent consultation between the requirements and photo­
interpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and
Arthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for
discussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (gener­
ally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities
Committee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Recon­
naissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108
The idea of using British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in
the spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upset that his aircraft had
not been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December
1956 standdown-was searching for ways to reduce the political risks
of overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for mis­
sions over the Soviet Union. One of his proposals was to use non-US
pilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible de­
nial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense
Department, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President
Eisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2
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proJect.
During the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick
White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L.
MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on sev­
eral occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the
CIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting
in which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had
consented to the resumption of U-2 missions over the Soviet Union,
resulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957.
But when flights ceased in October, the thought of British participa­
tion became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the
British to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final politi­
cal decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February
1958, Bis sell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj ~---~__J
to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to
'"" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the
COMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 6 May 1957
(TS); idem, "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
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