The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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select a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to
Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2. 110
In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came
to project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA
officials to work out an agreement on plans and procedures for the
joint project. The two sides decided to establish a small RAF contin­
gent that would be integrated into and supported by Detachment B at
Adana. The British missions would be operationally controlled by
CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots began
training in Texas. One of these pilots, Squadron Leader Christopher
H. Walker, died in a training accident in July 1958. Because of the
addition of RAF officers to the program, Project AQUATONE re­
ceived a new codename, CHALICE. By the end of November 1958,
three RAF pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B at Adana
with Turkish approval.
Formal approval by the political leaders of the United Kingdom
and the United States had come several months earlier. On 27 August
-1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British
participation in the project as long as he had the right to approve or
disapprove all operational flights by RAF pilots. On the same day,
President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle for the joint pro­
.
Ill
Ject.
Both sides stood to gain from the joint nature of the U-2 project.
For Richard Bissell, British participation was a means to gain an addi­
tional source of authorization for overflights of the Soviet Union. Six
months earlier, Bissell had cabled to the London Chief of Station that
he wanted British participation because it would "facilitate operations
by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of author­
ity accorded by US political authorities." 112
President Eisenhower viewed British participation as a way to
confuse the Soviets as to the sponsorship of particular overflights and
also to spread the risk in the event of a loss. Furthermore, he was used
"" OSA History, chap. 13, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword).
'" Ibid.. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., p. I (TS Codeword).
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