The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Secret NOFQRO.L
Chapter 3
to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and
believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as­
pect of their alliance with the United States.
113
On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical ex­
tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two
countries on the U-2 program. The direct involvement of the British
also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the
Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United
Kingdom than to the United States. The British also may have rea­
soned that direct participation in the program was the best way to en­
sure that they had a right to share in the U-2's take. Otherwise, the
United States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2
photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By November 1958, British pilots had joined Detachment B, and
arrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be
using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final
exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au­
thority for the joint program: "Br itish missions are carried out on
your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au­
thorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have
established. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two
complementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ
Richard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source
of approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early
1960, this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted
two highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at
a time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight
for almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots
in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the
United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi­
lots took part in overflights.
In Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2
program was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude
weather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support
this cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early
'" Goodpaster interview (S).
,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I0-11 (TS Cod,:word).
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