The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 1
4
The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres­
sive in August I 952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating
Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home
island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft
stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re­
connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become
a very dangerous business.
Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance
of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such
missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet
Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation
determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly
strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South
Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa­
tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan­
ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance
While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re­
connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began
planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using
new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new,
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of
Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th
Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war
he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais­
sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called
pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential
enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat
reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948,
Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa­
bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution
cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu­
nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the
Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development
Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.5
' Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC. 19 August 1985 (S).
SeoFat