The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in­
terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in deve loping an operational ICB M. the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.'
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the United States would enjoy a techno­
logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num­
ber of obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.s
Faced with rising public and Congressional concern about the
missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in­
fonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behind to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti­
cism of the missile gap from Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho­
tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he
stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a minimum pending the
• Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO.
' .. What About the Missile Gap'1 .. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13.
Sec. et NOFORN
Chapter 4
Seci:et