The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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162
Sec, et NOfOF'IN
Chapter 4
availability of this new equipment." Quarles objected that the satel­
lites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied
that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build
a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower
finally conceded that "one or two flights might possibly be permissi­
ble," but he ruled out "an extensive program." In light of the "crisis
which is impending over Berlin" he did not want to be provocative. 6
As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower
stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, al­
though the Soviet Union's resumption of ICBM testing almost per­
suaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President
tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he
called in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdraw­
ing his authorization, explaining that "there seems no hope for the fu­
ture unless we can make some progress in negotiation." Eisenhower
remained worried by "the terrible propaganda impact that would be
occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail." Although he
agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the
"distortions several senators are making of our military position rela­
tive to the Soviets," Eisenhower believed that such information
would not be worth "the political costs." 7
The President remained willing to consider flights that did not
overfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic in­
telligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The
two missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June
1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved
both an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air­
craft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry in­
tercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds
after launch.8
Efforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration mis­
sions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell
met with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight
• Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha.
DDEL (TS); Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, Mayday, p.
173.
' Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 514-515: Beschloss. Mayday,
p.176.
• Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 ( 18 June I 959), OSA records, job
67-8-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword).
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