The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 4
One of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se­
lected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that
penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest
chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system.
Colonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as
the preferred route for the next overflight had stated, "There is a rea­
sonable chance of completing this operation without detection."
Escaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet
SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major
threat to the U-2.
CIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go
undetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's
ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very
early stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the
U-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning
against future overflights from Pakistan (or anywhere else, for that
matter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell
that "experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL
indicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/
Afghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor." 11
Unfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the
logical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that
the risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intel­
ligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack
of success at interception to date had probably made the project staff
overconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
were pressing for more photos of the Soviet Union in order to settle
the missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and
Congress.
THE LAST OVERFLIGHT: OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Even before the 9 April overflight took place, President Eisenhower
had consented on 28 March to an additional overflight during the
month of April. His willingness to allow yet another overflight was
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Colonel Burke,
Acting Chief, DPD. "Operational Priority of Proposed CHALICE Missions," 26 April
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A, box 10. "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
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