The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sec, et NOPORICJ
Chapter 4
strengthened when the Soviet Union did not protest the 9 April mis­
sion. As Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky later re­
marked about the lack of protest, ''This was virtually inviting us to
repeat the sortie ... ~=
Although President Eisenhower had authorized another over­
flight for April, he left the designation of its targets up to the experts
at the ClA. Of the three missions that remained under consideration.
one-Operation SUN SPOT-would overfly southern targets,
Tyuratam and Vladimirovka, while the other two would cover rail­
road networks in the north-central portion of the Soviet Union. The
intelligence community had been interested in this area ever since late
1959, when there were indications that the Soviets were building an
SS-6 launch facility there. This was the first indication that :SS-6s
might be located anywhere other than Tyuratam testing facility. where
the missiles were launched from a general purpose launching pad.
The intelligence community was anxious to obtain photography of a
" George B. Kistiakowsky. A Scientist lll rlie \¥/,ire House (CamhriJg.:: l·t.1rvarJ
Univ.:rsity Press. 1976). p. 3::8.
SA-2 surface-to-air missile
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