The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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180
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 4
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Khrushchev and the U-2
wreckage
This revelation completely demolished the US cover story., and
senior administration officials then debated what the appropriate
course of action should be. Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility
for the overflight and resign. but President Eisenhower did not want
to give the world the impression that he was not in control of his ad­
ministration. On Wednesday, 11 May, the President read a statement
to the press in which he assumed full responsibility for the U-2 mis­
sion but left open the question of future overflights, even though four
days earlier he had approved the recommendation of his key foireign
policy advisers to terminate all provocative intelligence operations
against the Soviet Union:'~
The U-2 affair had its greatest consequences when the
long-awaited summit meeting in Paris began less than a week latc:r on
16 May. Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted on being the first
speaker and read a long protest about the overflight, ending with :a de­
mand for an apology from President Eisenhower. In his reply
" OSA Historv. chap.
I ➔ , pp. 14-16 (TS CocJ,:worcJJ: Bcschloss. Mayday. pp. 43-66.
243-J58.
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