The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection
of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952
to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development
Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~
In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the
Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked
closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol­
lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre
Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais­
sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World
War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air
Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.
Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance
was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that
the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup­
plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584
(Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to
90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component
quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn­
ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar
could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal
range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of
the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn,
Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to
65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning
radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would
not be activated. 9
The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un­
like Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar
technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im­
proved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad­
vocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.
' Leghorn interview (S).
' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
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