The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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See, el NGfiOAN
Chapter 4
the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a
light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and
then a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a
cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the
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way to an assignment.
CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER MAY 1960
One of the most important changes in the overflight program after the
loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal
procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four
years of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower adminis­
tration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over­
flight program. The President personally authorized all flights over
the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the
DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to
CIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions
or of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State
or his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary.
Colonel (later General) Goodpaster.
The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very
unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re­
viewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his
hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis­
ers before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a
second approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by
the RAF pilots in Detachment 8.
The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in
the approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister
Macmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots
who remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more
operational missions (although the use of British pilots was consid­
ered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process
•• Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft
form). but Kelly Johnson's "U-2R Log" records on 25 September 1969: "We havt: no
Right test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven
years. but he doesn't have an ATR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for
him-not even flying the Beechcraft."
Seccet