John Company

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

CIA-UAP-003 · page 201 of 406

Page 201 of 406 of CIA-UAP-003

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188
Chapter 4
Sec,et="
became more formal as the National Security Council became
involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the
National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the
early 1960s, the Sptcial Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military
Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his
place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 50
Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2
mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission
giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the
targets to be photographed. flight times, and emergency landing sites.
Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they
were placed in black. looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special
Group was generally final, although on occasion controversial issues
were presented to the President for his decision.
This approval process did not come into play immediately after
May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the
detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October
1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred. this time over Cuba. By
this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the
Special Group approved the mission (sec chapter 5).
The approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program
that changed after May l 960. The process for establishing require­
ments for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more for­
mal. In August 1960 the US Intelligence Board took over the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the '·coor­
dinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for
overhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas." The DCID
defined "overhead reconnaissance'' to include "all reconnaissance
for foreign-intelligence purposes by satellite. or by any vehicle over
'" The Special Group. which had becn creatcd by NSC lntcl!igen,e Documt:nt 54 l 211 in
1955 to ovcrsc.: covert a,tivitics. was originally known as the 54 l 2 Committ.:e. Later the
Sp,xial Group bccame known as the: 303 Committce and then thc 40 Committee. Unitcd
States Congress. Senate. Sckct Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Rcspcct to lntt:lligcnce Activities. Foreign and .Wiliwry l111elligence. book l. (Washington.
DC: US Government Printing Office. 1976). pp. 4S-53.