The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency
and the military services. The report further recommended that the
CIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims
that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the
report's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the
director of NPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by
the Secretary of Defense, and the deputy director would come from
one of the military services. The first director of NPIC was Arthur S.
Lundahl, head of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. 55
One additional major change in the U-2 program in the years im­
mediately following the May Day incident-although not directly re­
lated to the loss of Powers' U-2-was the departure of Richard
Bissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the
Agency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of
Bissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became
Deputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets
in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais­
sance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the
OXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously
independent Development Projects Staff became the Development
Projects Division (DPD) of the DDP and now controlled all Agency
air operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result,
U-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to sup­
port DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering
strategic and tactical intelligence.
Although the reorganization made sense in terms of increasing
the efficiency of Agency air operations, the use of the U-2 to support
covert action disturbed Bissell's backers among the scientists advising
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, especially James Killian and
Edwin Land. They were concerned that Bissell was becoming too in­
volved in covert action and was not able to devote sufficient time to
the overhead reconnaissance program. Then came the disastrous Bay
of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which discredited Bissell with the
Kennedy administration in general and the two scientists in particular.
Later that year, Bissell lost another important source of support when
Allen Dulles resigned as DCI in November 1961. During his final
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
Sec, et NOF'ORl<J
Chapter 4
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