The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sec, et NOfiO~N
Chapter 4
Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap­
proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit­
ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for
approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the
military services could also submit requirements through the DCI us­
ing their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser­
vices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the
Special Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR. 51
The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the
military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early
I 960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the
US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan
missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however,
came very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore,
came under COMOR·s area of responsibility. Once the war in
Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re­
sponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).
To reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA
and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing
satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro­
vide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national
level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961,
and it was followed by three additional agreements during the next
four years. 50
Interest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military
services and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpre­
tation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May
1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency
group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community.
Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead­
ership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the
study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in
December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation
'' Ibid (TS Codeword).
" Problems of classitication prevent a more detailc:d discussion of this aspect of the recon­
naissance program. which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at
a higher level of classification.
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