The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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205
overflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on
a mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult
for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international wa­
ters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed recon­
naissance program into four missions: two overflights and two
peripheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights
were thus designed to be quick "in-and-out" operations across the
narrow width of the island instead of flights along the entire length of
Cuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illus­
trates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the
length of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would
be laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes
greatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of
information on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's
9
coverage.
To ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of
the highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the
weather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast.
Weather proved to be a major problem during the month of
Se.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of
U-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) pre­
vented the launching of any missions from 6 through 16 September.
Moreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the fa­
vorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds pre­
vented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather
continued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission
3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites.
Three days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle of Pines and Bay of
Pigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise
missile site. 10
The cautious series of U-2 flights in September had turned up
many more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of
surface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions
' Lehman Report, pp. 12-13 (TS Codeword).
'" DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, ··U-2 Overflights of Cuba. 29
August through 14 October 1962,"" 27 February 1963, DCI n:cords, job 80-8-1676R. box.
17, folder 18 {S). Although this DCI memo states that ··the delay in completing the photo­
graphic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period,"
a more contemporary COMOR memo re~orted a standdown of U-2 overtlights until 16
September as a result of the loss of mission No. GRC-127 over China on 8 September.
Memorandum for DOC! Carter from James Q. Reber. Chairman, COMOR. "Historical
Analysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba,"" 24 October 1962. IC Staff. COMIREX records. job
33-B- I 22A. box I. "Cuba Requirements. 1961-63" (TS Codeword).
Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 5
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