The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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206
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told
the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding
SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's
southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable
restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost cer­
tainly not operational." 11 The Special Group then requested the
preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time
for its next meeting on 9 October.
In the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance pro­
gram that the Special Group had approved in September. In early
October two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast
on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see
map on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This
brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of sur­
face-to-surface missiles.
Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the
September and early October missions had avoided was the most
likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance rec­
ommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in partic­
ular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29,
coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means
that there may well be many more sites now being built of which
we are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent in­
stances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4
(SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or
denied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a
list of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.
On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's rec­
ommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the
..suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was
also designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to
be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2
" Minutes of the Special Group meeting. 4 October 1962. in Memorandum for DC!
:\lcCone from J. S. Earman. Inspector General, ··Handling of Raw Intelligence
Information During the Cuban Arms Buildup." 20 November 1962, DC! records, job
80-B- 1676R. box I 7 (TS Codeword).
" Lehman Report. p. 30 (TS Codc::word).
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