The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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12
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
The Lockheed CL-282
Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay
stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth,
and told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he
would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not
interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left
the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time."
Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force
development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air
Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care­
fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early
June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's
choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at
Wright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most
powerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and
Bell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing
gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."
Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission
was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re­
connaissance experts had gained their practical experience during
" C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U).
" Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12.
See1et